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NOTES
THE POWER OF A TRUSTEE TO EXECUTE OIL AND GAS LEASES
Oil and gas leases' are an anomaly in the law of property. In at-
tempting to fit oil and gas interests into the traditional property con-
cepts, courts have been unable to agree as to the nature of the landowner's
interest in oil and gas2 or the interest created in the lessee.' Add to this
an express active trus in which the powers of the trustee are expressed
in terms of "sale" and, "lease" with no mention of oil and gas as such,
and a thorny legal problem is raised as to the power of the trustee to
execute an oil and gas lease.
The situations that can arise are as varied as the provisions of the
trust instrument which must be construed. Of course if the trust instru-
1. The term "lease" is a misnomer. The rules of landlord-tenant do not apply to
these "leases," and there is a taking of a part of the corpus of the estate not associated
with the term "lease." See New Am. Oil Co. v. Troyer, 166 Ind. 402, 77 N.E. 719
(1906); Stahl v. Illinois Oil Co., 45 Ind. App. 211, 90 N.E. 632 (1910); SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAw, 69 (1955) ; Simonton, The Nature. of the Interest of
the Grantee Under an Oil and Gas Lease, 25 W. VA. L. REV. 295 (1918).
2. Using the analogy to solid minerals, some jurisdictions have concluded that the
ownership of the surface carries with it ownership of the oil and gas in place in the
nature of a determinable fee. Ownership is lost by drainage across property lines.
This theory is followed in Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. See SULLIVAN, op. Cit. supra at 42, n. 17.
Other jurisdictions, using the analogy to percolating waters or animals ferae
naturae, have held that the owner of the surface only has the exclusive right to drill
for oil and gas and to retain as absolute owner all that is reduced to possession. This
theory prevails in California, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, and
Oklahoma. See SULLIVAN, op. cit. supra at 46, n. 19.
Some cases speak of a qualified ownership in oil and gas in place. The surface
owners are said to have a common property interest. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177
U.S. 190 (1900) ; Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490 (1902) ; DONLEY, THE
LAW OF COAL, OIL, AND GAS IN WEST VIRGINIA AND VIRGINIA, § 1 (1951).
However, for the purposes of this note it is unnecessary to distinguish between
these theories of ownership, for all jurisdictions have reached the same practical re-
sults. See Summers, The Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes for
Conservation of Oil and Gas, 13 TUL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1935).
3. The interest of the lessee has been called a determinable fee, profit a' pendre,
incorporeal hereditament, license, license coupled with an interest, and estate in land.
See SULLIVAN, op. cit. supra,, at 87.
The most exact description of the lessee's interest is a profit a' pendre. The lessee
is permitted to go upon the land of another and extract something of value therefrom.
See Simonton, supra note 1.
Generally, the nature of the lessee's interest is the same no matter what form of
granting clause is used. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Oil and Gas § 10.26 (1952);
Blake, The Oil and Gas Lease, 13 So. CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1940).
4. This inquiry includes private and charitable trusts, but is not concerned with
passive or implied trusts.
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ment gives the trustee express authority to execute oil and gas leases,
there is no doubt as to his power.' In this situation the trustee may lease
the entire plot for oil and gas, or a part thereof.6
The real problem arises when the settlor has made no provision con-
cerning oil and gas, and the court or the trustee must decide if there is
authority to execute an oil and gas lease. This problem is especially im-
portant for the trustee, cestui que trust, and the prospective lessee.'
I. THE CASES
Relatively few cases have arisen in which the power of the trustee
to execute oil and gas leases has been directly challenged. Most litiga-
tion has concerned the disposition of the royalty from the oil and gas
developments between the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen. In
deciding these cases the courts base their reasoning on the common law
rules concerning life tenant-remainderman. The open mine doctrine is
especially relevant." In attempting to find if this doctrine is applicable
to the case at bar, the courts must consider the power of the trustee and
the intention of the settlor. If they conclude from all the surrounding
circumstances that the primary intention of the settlor was to provide
for the life beneficiary, and that he intended that the mines be opened
under the powers given, the courts will hold that the mines were open in
contemplation of law when the trust was established.' The life bene-
ficiary will then be entitled to all the royalty as income. But if this in-
tention is not found, the courts will treat the royalty as proceeds from
a sale of trust property and order it preserved for the remaindermen as
part of the corpus of the trust."0 This reasoning has so influenced the
courts when they have come to consider the authority of the trustee to
execute an oil and gas lease, that it seems expedient to discuss trusts
5. Daly v. Beckett, [1857] 24 Beav. 114, 53 Eng. Rep. 301.
6. Fry v. McCormick, 170 Kan. 741, 228 P.2d 727 (1951).
7. The trustee may be reluctant to entail the risk of exceeding his authority and
becoming liable to the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries want to develop the property
most profitably, and may be afraid of drainage by nearby wells if no lease is given.
This drainage is damnum absque injuria. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Oil and
Gas § 10.5 (1952). The lessee does not want to expend money and effort in attempting
to develop the property unless he is sure of the validity of his lease. See Blake, Power
of a Trustee to Lease for Oil and Gas, 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 115, 118 (1949).
8. The open mine doctrine operates as an exception to the rule that a life tenant
may not grant oil and gas leases, and that if a lease is executed with the acquiescence
of the remaindermen, the life tenant gets only the income from the royalty, not the
royalty itself. If the mine was open when the life estate began, the life tenant may
work the mine and keep the royalty as income. See Woodward, The Open Mine Doc-
trine in Oil and Gas Cases, 35 TEX. L. REV. 538 (1957).
9. See note 8 supra.
10. See Heyl v. Northern Trust Co., 312 Ill. App. 207, 38 N.E.2d 374 (1941);
Blakely v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564 (1896).
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containing remaindermen who are not the present income beneficiaries
separately from charitable trusts and those in which the remaindermen
and income beneficiaries are the same persons.1
A. Trists Containing Life Beneficiaries and Remaindermen,
If the trustee is given power to lease and manage the property, but
no authority to sell, he has no power to execute an oil and gas lease if
there has been no prior development which would warrant the application
of the open mine doctrine."2 It is reasonable to suppose that the settlor
intended to authorize ordinary farming leases, not unusual leases or
leases of unopened mines.' There are dicta in several coal cases to the
effect that if the land were coal land, and valueless except for mining,
the intention must have been to authorize leases of the coal.14 However,
in the case of oil and gas there are no such surface characteristics that
would mark the land as oil land.
If there has been prior oil and gas development on the property, the
trustee is authorized to renew a lease previously made by the settlor.'5 In
this case, the settlor may have intended to include oil and gas leases in
the general authority to lease, since he was aware of its development.
The courts have looked to the effect of oil and gas exploitation, and
have concluded that it is a taking of a portion of the realty. Conse-
quently, they have equated it with "sale," and have found no authority
to execute an oil and gas lease without a power of sale. However, it does
not follow that a trustee with a power of sale may always execute such
a lease. The power of sale may or may not be coupled with management
responsibilities and other powers. It may be limited by subsequent pro-
visions. These arrangements give rise to different legal consequences.
The case law is not definitely settled on the question of whether a
trustee with a power of sale but with no management powers may ex-
11. This classification should not be relevant if the purpose is to discover the in-
tention of the settlor. It seems to represent an unnecessary concern to preserve the
interests of the remaindermen. These rights could be protected adequately by requiring
the trustee to preserve a part, or all, of the royalty for the remaindermen. See 2 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 189.7 (1939). Statutes have dealt with this problem. E.g. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 730.11; FLA. STAT. § 690.10 (1955).
12. Smith v. Womack, 231 S.W. 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (title to lease un-
marketable); Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughtee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N.E. 818 (1909) ; Lanyon Zinc
Co. v. Freeman, 68 Kan. 691, 75 Pac. 995 (1904). But see Wallis v. Barker, [19033 88
L.T.R. (n.s.) 685 (Ch.) (power to lease any portion of the estate includes a power to
lease for coal).
13. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughtee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N.E. 818 (1909).
14. Appeal of Wentz, 106 Pa. 300 (1884); McClintock v. Dana, 106 Pa. 386
(1884). But see Clegg v. Rowland, [1866] L.R. 2 Eq. 160.
15. First Nat'l Bank v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 144 Kan. 645, 62 P.2d 891 (1936).
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ecute an oil and gas lease.' It has been held that a person with a power
of attorney to sell realty is not thereby authorized to grant oil and gas
leases.' In a case involving a trust, no power to execute an oil and gas
lease was found where the trustees were directed to convert the property
into cash as speedily as possible." This result seems to be in accordance
with the intention of the settlor that the trustee sell the property and
either pay the proceeds to the beneficiaries or retain them for further
trust purposes. When the settlor authorizes a sale in this situation, he
does not intend that the trustee go into the oil and gas business.
If the power of sale is coupled with some management responsibili-
ties, it seems that the trustee may execute an oil and gas lease.'9 In these
cases, the courts may have been influenced by the danger that nearby wells
might drain the oil and gas across property lines, leaving the trust estate
depleted and remediless2 However, in two of the cases it was not
shown that there were other developments in the vicinity.2" The court's
theory is that an oil and gas lease vests in the lessee an interest in land
less than a fee simple. Since the trustee is authorized to sell the whole
interest, he may also convey a lesser interest. This same reasoning
might be applied to cases where there is a power of sale without manage-
ment powers. However, the courts have not done so, perhaps not con-
sidering it justifiable to take such liberty with the settlor's words unless
he has bestowed at least management responsibilities upon the trustee.
The power of the trustee to execute oil and gas leases is again nar-
rowed when the power of sale is accompanied by a restriction or prohibi-
tion as to an encumbrance or lease.22 The analogy between an oil and
gas lease and a sale has not been drawn in these cases. Rather, the
authority to execute an oil and gas lease has been deemed restricted by
16. See Avis v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Tex. 489, 174 S.W.2d 255 (1943) (question
expressly reserved).
17. Bean v. Bean, 79 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (powers of attorney are
strictly construed).
18. See Drinkhouse v. Birch Ranch and Oil Co., 97 Cal. App.2d 923, 219 P.2d 45
(1950) (independent ground for decision). This case did not involve the life bene-
ficiary-remainderman situation.
19. Ilari v. Ewing, 314 Ky. 182, 234 S.W.2d 293 (1950); Boulvare v. Sinclair
Prairie Oil Co., 219 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Oliver v. Culpepper, 209 Ark.
326, 190 S.W.2d 457 (1945) ; Franklin v. Margay Oil Co., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486
(1944) ; Heffelfinger v. Scott, 142 Kan. 395, 47 P.2d 66 (1935) (charitable trust).
But see Re Bruner's Will, 363 Pa. 552, 70 Atl.2d 222 (1950) (dicta).
20. See Franklin v. Margay Oil Co., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944); Hef-
felfinger v. Scott, 142 Kan. 395, 47 P.2d 66 (1935).
21. See Ilari v. Ewing, 314 Ky. 182, 234 S.W.2d 293 (1950) ; Oliver v. Culpepper,
209 Ark. 326, 190 S.W.2d 457 (1945).
22. See Woelk v. Woelk, 174 Kan. 136, 254 P.2d 297 (1953) (life tenant with
power of sale, but no power to mortgage or encumber) ; Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal.2d 353,
121 P.2d 484 (1940) (lease permitted only subject to sale of property).
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these provisions.2" For example, the Kansas court eventually based its
decision that an outstanding oil and gas lease was an encumbrance upon a
case which had held that an outstanding agricultural lease was an encum-
brance.2 Also failing to draw the analogy to "sale," the California court
thought it necessary to use its power of equitable deviation to permit the
trustee to execute an oil and gas lease not subject to the restriction in the
trust instrument pertaining to "lease.
25
The intention of the settlor in authorizing a sale in these cases
probably was not to authorize oil and gas development. But it seems that
in like manner it cannot be said that in forbidding an encumbrance or
lease, the settlor necessarily intended to forbid the execution of an oil
and gas lease.2' Nevertheless, courts have been leery of expanding the
authority of the trustee when the settlor has explicitly limited it in any
way. In this situation an oil and gas lease is a "lease."
A trustee with power to sell, lease and generally manage the trust
property seems to have sufficient authority to execute an oil and gas
lease." In these cases the courts' primary concern again may be the
necessity of protecting the trust estate from drainage by nearby wells
and permitting optimum development for the beneficiaries, rather than
the technical direction of the settlor.28 If there is no danger of drain-
age, and the court is concerned with construing the instrument accord-
ing to the settlor's expressed intention, there may be difficulty even in
this situation. Thus, in Avis z). First Nat'l Bank, 9 the court originally
held that "in the absence of language authorizing such trustee to make
mineral leases, he is not authorized to grant the right to take the gas and
oil from the property where no wells were open . . . at the time of the
creation of the trust."3 " On motion for rehearing this opinion was with-
drawn and another substituted,"' which held that the trustee had the
power to execute an oil and gas lease under this instrument. 2 The court
23. See note 22 supra.
24. See Woelk v. Woelk, 174 Kan. 136, 254 P.2d 297 (1953), citing Haggert v.
Wheeler, 116 Kan. 702, 229 Pac. 357 (1924). The latter case cites Clark v. Fisher, 54
Kan. 403, 38 Pac. 493 (1894) (an outstanding agricultural lease is an encumbrance).
25. Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal.2d 353, 121 P.2d 484 (1940).
26. Oil and gas development is not necessarily inconsistent with a direction that
the trustee manage the estate personally or permit the cestui to occupy the premises.
27. Avis v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Tex. 489, 174 S.W.2d 255 (1943); Layman v.
Hodnett, 205 Ark. 367, 168 S.W.2d 819 (1943).
28. See Laymen v. Hodnett, 205 Ark. 367, 168 S.W.2d 819 (1943).
29. 141 Tex. 489, 174 S.W.2d 255 (1943).
30. See Atwood v. Kleberg, 135 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 1943).
31. No citation has been found to the original opinion. Perhaps it is not re-
ported. The quoted passage was taken from Atwood v. Kleberg, supra, note 30, which
was decided before the opinion was withdrawn.
32. Avis v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Tex. 489, 174 S.W.2d 255 (1943).
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declared that the words in a will are to be construed according to usage
sanctioned by judicial decisions. It then cited cases which had declared
that an oil and gas lease was the same as a sale of real estate. Since this
had been sanctioned judicial usage when the will was executed, the tes-
tator had the right to rely on the repeated declarations of the court that
the power of sale included the power to execute an oil and gas lease. The
court noted that the substantive rights of the life beneficiary and re-
maindermen would be preserved. The royalty would go to the remainder-
men, and the interest on the royalty to the life beneficiary. It was also
pointed out that this was not a bare power of sale, but other powers were
given to the trustee.
This case seems to indicate that if the court has a strong policy to
discover the intention of the settlor at the time the trust was established,
and takes a narrow view of the powers conferred, it will experience dif-
ficulty in finding a power to execute an oil and gas lease without express
authorization.33 This approach seems unsatisfactory for oil and gas. If
the settlor expressly granted these broad powers, it is reasonable to as-
sume that he wished the trustee to have plenary authority to control the
trust estate. His primary intention may not be found in the expressly
delegated powers, but rather in his concern that the property be managed
most effectively and profitably for the benefit of the cestui que trust. In
adopting a narrow interpretation of these powers, the courts may be de-
priving the trustee of authority to fully develop the potential of the
property because of an oversight by the settlor.
If the trust instrument gives no express powers to sell or lease the
property, a cautious trustee will not execute an oil and gas lease without
a court order declaring it to be within the powers of the trust instrument
or granting an equitable deviation. If the management powers of the
trustee are very general, this power should be held included in the trust
instrument without a deviation." In any event in these cases, a court of
equity has inherent power to appoint a trustee to execute an oil and gas
lease binding even contingent remaindermen if convinced of the neces-
sity of preventing depletion of the trust estate.3" It can give this power
to the present trustee of the estate.3 6
33. The trustee in the Avis case had "full, ample, complete and absolute power to
manage, control, sell, and dispose of the property, rent, and make leases thereon." Avis
v. First Nat'l Bank, supra, note 32.
34. See Martin v. Eshick, - Miss. -, 90 So.2d 635, judg. corrected, - Miss. -,
92 So.2d 244 (1957) (question reserved). But see Stokely v. State, 149 Miss. 435, 115
So. 563 (1928).
35. See Pedroja v. Pedroja, 153 Kan. 82, 102 P.2d 1012 (1940) ; Robinson v. Barett,
143 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d 587 (1935).
36. Robinson v. Barett, 143 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d 587 (1935).
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If the trust instrument not only lacks express powers, but also posi-
tively forbids a sale or lease, it seems that there can be no inference of
a power to execute an oil and gas lease without an equitable deviation."
To obtain a deviation it is necessary to prove that the corpus is subject to
depletion and that this exigency was not foreseen by the settlor.5 Thus,
the property cannot be developed for oil and gas until there are other
wells in the vicinity which threaten to drain the minerals from the trust
property.
However, even in these cases, where the trustee is forbidden to sell
or lease the trust property by express language or by implication, it can-
not definitely be said that the settlor wished to forbid oil and gas de-
velopment. An oil and gas lease would not necessarily be inconsistent
with these provisions. The only valid conclusion to be drawn is that the
settlor either did not consider oil and gas at all or thought it inapplicable
to the property in question. In any event, the previous decisions of the
courts do not permit them to draw an inference of a power to execute an
oil and gas lease in these cases.
B. Charitable Trusts and Private Trusts Where
Income Beneficiaries are also the Reinaindermnen
The courts seem more willing to find a power to execute an oil and
gas lease if the trust is charitable or if the income beneficiaries and re-
maindermen are the same persons. In these cases the power has been
found in the implied authority to lease, 9 the power to obtain a loan and
mortgage,"' and from the word "use."'"
The more liberal attitude of the courts in dealing with these trusts
is seen in Atwood v. Kleberg.42 The trustee had full power to sell, lease,
mortgage, and do all acts not inconsistent with the provisions of the will.
The court was faced with the original decision in Avis v. First Nat'l
Bank4" that the power to lease and convey did not include the power to
37. No cases have been found on this point, but the conclusion seems inescapable
from the decisions in cases where a sale is permitted, but a lease or encumbrance is
prohibited. See note 22 supra.
38. A court of equity possesses inherent power to order a sale of the trust prop-
erty even if this was expressly forbidden by the settlor. This power can only be used
when unforeseen circumstances require it to preserve the trust corpus and the primary
purpose of the trust. See 65 C.J., Trusts, § 612 n. 99 (1933).
39. Heffelfinger v. Scott, 142 Kan. 395, 47 P.2d 66 (1935).
40. Atwood v. Kleberg, 133 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1943), modified on rehearing,, 135
F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1943).
41. Stokely v. State, 149 Miss. 435, 115 So.563 (1928) (dissent).
42. 133 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1943), nwdified on rehearing, 135 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.
1943).
43. See Atwood v. Kleberg, 135 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 1943).
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execute an oil and gas lease. Nevertheless, the lease executed by the
trustee was held valid. On re-hearing the court based its decision on the
fact that the lease was executed incident to obtaining a loan and mort-
gage, and was thus necessary to preserve the trust estate.44  The courts
have distinguished other holdings by the fact that the rights of no other
persons are involved in these cases. 5
C. Summation of the Cases
There are only a few direct holdings on the power of a trustee to
execute an oil and gas lease. The conclusion to be drawn from these
authorities and from dicta in several other cases is that without a power
of sale no oil and gas lease may be executed by the trustee. Even if the
power of sale is given, there is no authority to lease for oil and gas if
there are negative limitations as to leases or encumbrances or if there is
a bare power of sale. A court of equity may authorize such leases if
there is a danger of depletion of the trust estate unforeseen by the settlor.
In the case of charitable trusts and trusts in which the remaindermen and
income beneficiaries are the same persons, one might expect a more lib-
eral attitude in favor of the trustee's power.
The law in this area is sparse and uncertain at best. Since oil and
gas leases are sui generis, it is difficult to determine the intention of the
settlor without specific direction. Statutes in several states have at-
tempted to alleviate this problem.
II. LEGISLATION
Statutes providing a method whereby executors, administrators,
guardians, and committees may execute oil and gas leases upon the land
in their charge have been rather widely adopted.46 There are also statu-
tory provisions authorizing the leasing of federal,47 state,4" county,49 and
44. Atwood v. Kleberg, supra note 43.
45. See Heffelfinger v. Scott, 142 Kan. 395, 49 P.2d 66 (1935) ; Stokely v. State,
149 Miss. 435, 115 So. 563 (1928) (dissent).
46. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 21, §§ 48-54 (1940); ARK. STAT. §§ 57-321-323 (1947);
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1538.5, 840; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-10-21 (1953) ; FLA. STAT.
§ 745.02 (1955) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-905 (1948) ; ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, § 375a (1955) ;
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-401-405 (Burns 1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1807,
59-2301-2304 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 387.150, 187.250 (1942); LA. REV. STAT. §§
9-1491-93 (1952); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 415, 605 (1942); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-20
(1953); N. D. REV. CODE §§ 38-1001-1011 (1943) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.26
(Page 1954) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 924-927 (1951) ; S.D. CODE § 35.1822 (1939);
TEx REv. CIv. STAT. arts. 4192, 3554 (1948); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3583 (1949).
47. 41 STAT. 437 (1920), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-192 (Supp. 1956).
48. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 46-1602-1624 (Burns 1952).
49. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 26-643-645 (Burns Supp. 1957).
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city and township lands5" for oil and gas. There seems to be an increas-
ing tendency to pass legislation concerning the power of a trustee to ex-
ecute oil and gas leases.5 Two statutory methods have been adopted.
The first method, represented primarily by the Texas52 and Okla-
homa 3 trust acts, consists in a declaration that a trustee of an express
trust has authority to execute an oil and gas lease in the absence of con-
trary or limiting provisions in the trust instrument or a subsequent re-
straining order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. There is
also a provision for the disposition of the royalties between the life
beneficiary and the remaindermen if no contrary intention is shown by
the settlor in the trust instrument.5"
A more general approach to this same method is seen in the Florida
trust act. 5 The language in this statute is similar to that in the English
trustee act.50 The trustee is deemed to have the power to sell and lease
the trust property in the absence of contrary or limiting provisions in the
trust instrument. This includes the authority to dispose of the property
"whether the division be horizontal, vertical, or made in any other way,"
and to lease "all rights and privileges above or below the surface of such
property .
The effectiveness of these statutes depends to a large extent upon
the interpretation that will be given them by the courts. If they are in-
terpreted as raising a presumption of a power to lease for oil and gas,
which can only be rebutted by clear evidence to the contrary, these statutes
will go a long way toward clearing up this area of law. However, if the
courts interpret clauses prohibiting a sale, lease or encumbrance as "con-
trary or limiting" provisions, little change will occur in the present state
of the law. The only area affected would be that in which no express
limitation was placed on the powers of the trustee. The former position
seems to be more in accordance with the primary intention of the settlor
that the property be used most productively for the benefit of the cestui
que trust. The trustee would have more freedom of action in using his
50. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-515-516 (Burns Supp. 1957).
51. See note 62 infra.
52. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 7425b-25 (1948).
53. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.24c (1951).
54. The Texas act provides that 271% of the gross proceeds (but not to exceed
50% of the net) is principal and the balance is income. See note 52 supra. The Okla-
homa act provides that the percent deductible for depletion under the federal tax laws is
principal, the balance is income. See note 53 supra. At the present time the amount
deductible for depletion under the federal tax law is 27Y2% of gross proceeds (but not
to exceed 50% of the net). For criticism of percentage depletion, see Freeman, Per-
centage Depletion For Oil-A Policy Issue, 30 IND. L. J. 399 (1955).
55. FLA. STAT. § 691.03 (1955).
56. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 GEo. 5, c. 19, § 12(2).
57. See note 55 supra.
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discretion without the expense and delay of court proceedings. The
settlor could still make any provision for the development or non-
development of oil and gas that he chose. Nevertheless, if he inadvert-
ently failed to provide for it, or did not think oil and gas relevant to the
property in question, his directives as to other matters would not be in-
terpreted as an intention that no oil and gas development take place.
If these statutes were interpreted as raising a presumption of an
authority to lease for oil and gas, it would be necessary to protect the
cestui que trust and remaindermen from an unfair allocation of the
royalty between income and principal by the trustee. This could be ac-
complished by enforcing the statutory division of the royalty unless the
settlor expressly made a contrary disposition."8 One major objection to
the leasing of trust lands for oil and gas would be removed by this in-
terpretation; namely, that the corpus would be depleted for the remainder-
men. Both the life beneficiary and the remaindermen would share in the
proceeds from oil and gas development. The interests of both would
be protected in a manner analagous to the amortization of other wasting
assets."
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals recently interpreted the income-
principal provisions of the Texas Trust Act. It held that the statute
supplements, rather than supplants, the desires of the settlor. The statu-
tory provisions for the disposition of royalty control only in the ab-
sence of a contrary intention. The court found a contrary intention
from a direction to the trustee to collect "all rent, royalties, bonuses,
payments, claims, settlements in compromise, all income of any nature,"
and to pay the "income" to the life beneficiary. All the royalty was
ordered paid to the life beneficiary as income. The trustee had express
authority to execute an oil and gas lease, and some wells were open when
the trust was established.6" This interpretation does not give maximum
effect to the statutory provision. No express direction was required to
overcome the statutory division. Rather a contrary intention sufficient
to make the statute inapplicable was found by implication.
The second statutory method whereby trustees of express trusts may
be authorized to execute oil and gas leases is by petition to a local court.6
In several of these states the class of "trustee" has been added to the
58. See note 54 supra.
59. Generally, when a trust estate includes wasting assets, the trustee is under a
duty either to sell the property, or to set aside part of the receipts as an amortization
fund to preserve the corpus of the trust. Scott argues that even without a statute, this
principle should be applied to oil and gas developments on trust estates, rather than
the open mine doctrine. See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 239.3 (1939).
60. St. Mark's Episcopal Church v. Lowry, 271 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
61. See notes 62 and 64 infra.
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statutes which permit leases by the executors, administrators, and
guardians. 2 The procedure generally begins with a petition to the county,
circuit, or probate court stating the advantages to the trust estate of grant-
ing such a lease. Then, after a hearing, publication, and competitive
bidding, the court may order the trustee to grant the lease. The trans-
action is subject to the approval and supervision of the court. The maxi-
mum time allowed for the duration of the lease is usually set by the
statutes. No provision has been included in these statutes for the divi-
sion of the royalty between income and principal.63
Other states limit this second type of statutory relief to trusts which
contain contingent remaindermen. These statutes also provide a method
whereby oil 'and gas leases may be executed upon lands subject to any
kind of contingent future interest. A trustee is appointed to execute
the oil and gas lease binding even the contingent remaindermen. The
statute may provide that the royalty be dealt with according to the discre-
tion of the court or that it be invested by the trustee and only the interest
paid to the life beneficiary."4
This method seems to be more definite in its application. It does not
depend upon the absence of a contrary or limiting provision in the trust
instrument. Authority to grant an oil and gas lease may be given by the
court whenever it appears to be advantageous or expedient to the trust
estate."5 Thus, it is not necessary to show that the property is subject
to drainage by nearby wells as is the case in obtaining an equitable devia-
tion. However, the statutes which limit the relief to trusts which con-
tain contingent remaindermen are too narrow in their application. For
example, the life beneficiaries or remaindermen in a particular trust may
be infants. They would thus have vested interests, making the statute
inapplicable to their trust. However, they would still not be sui juris and
could not join in executing a valid lease not subject to subsequent attack.
Uncertainty would continue in these situations.
This second method entails expense and delay. A trustee- should
have more latitude in using his individual discretion than executors, ad-
ministrators, or guardians. These latter are merely probate fiduciaries
or court appointed agents. The management and discretionary powers
62. MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 709.5 (1948) (a fiduciary) ; NED. REV. STAT. §§ 57-210-
212.01 (Supp. 1955) (trustee) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-675,689.4 (1950) (trustee of any
other estate) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3583 (1949) (trustee of any estate) ; Wyo. CoMp.
STAT. ANN. §§ 8-203-205 (1945) (trustee of probate estate).
63. See note 62 supra.
64. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 353.300-380 (1944); N.D. REv. CODE § 38-1012 (Supp.
1953).
65. See note 64 supra.
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of a trustee have been expanding in recent years, and it seems strange
that he must be controlled by the courts in this situation.6"
Arkansas, by statute, expressly authorizes trustees of eleemosynary
institutions to execute oil and gas leases by a majority vote unless other-
wise provided in the charter, constitution, or by-laws of the institution.67
The absence of a like provision for trustees of private trusts may be a
negative admission of the concern to preserve the rights of remainder-
men in a private trust.
The difficulty with any legislation in this area is the general rule
that a trustee has only those powers conferred upon him by the settlor.
It has been held that courts, and even the legislature, cannot enlarge the
powers of a trustee under a trust instrument.68 Thus, if the settlor has
not authorized oil and gas development expressly or by permissible im-
plication, legislative enactments may be powerless to enlarge this power
unless there is danger of depletion. The best and most certain method
to facilitate oil and gas development is by careful draftsmanship of the
trust instrument.
III. DRAFTSMANSHIP
Every attorney who draws up a trust instrument should consider
this problem. Express provision should be made granting the trustee
authority to execute oil and gas leases and other related agreements such
as unitization and pooling contracts.69 The division of royalty between
income and principal should also be provided for, leaving it to the dis-
cretion of the trustee or making an express percentage disposition. If
express authority is given to execute oil and gas leases, and no provision
is made for the disposition of the royalty, it seems that the courts will
apply the open mine doctrine and award the entire royalty to the life
beneficiary as income.7"
66. See Stephenson, Expanding Power of Trustees, 25 FORDHAm L. REv. 50 (1957).
67. ARK. STAT. § 53-301 (1947).
68. "[C]ourts in the exercise of equity powers may not enlarge, modify or defeat
the terms of the trust, saving and excepting only in cases where it shall appear that
that is necessary to preserve the corpus of the trust." In re Caswell's Will, 197 Wis.
327, 222 N.W. 235, 237 (1928). See also Upham v. Plankerton, 152 Wis. 275, 140
N.W. 5 (1912).
69. Pooling is the uniting of small, separately owned tracts for the purpose of
integrating the minimum acreage necessary for a drilling unit.
Unitization is the consolidation of all the interests in an oil and gas pool for the
purpose of operating the reservoir as a single producing mechanism. See SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW, 308 (1955).
70. See St. Mark's Episcopal Church v. Lowry, 271 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954) ; Eley's Appeal, 103 Pa. 300 (1883) ; Daly v. Beckett [1857] 24 Beav. 114, 53
Eng. Rep. 301.
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Authority should be conferred for oil and gas leasing even if no
present development is taking place in the vicinity, or is even foreseen.
Oil and gas may be found anywhere; and, before the termination of the
trust, it might be essential to have such a provision." Careful drafts-
manship could prevent this problem from arising."'
IV. INDIANA LAW
Although Indiana has been an oil producing state since about 1890,
its production is not significant nationally. At present, ' production is
limited to the Southwestern part of the state, but there is a possibility
of a greatly expanded operation in the near future."
The owner of the surface in Indiana does not own the oil and gas
in place, but has the exclusive right to drill for oil and gas and reduce it
to possession and consequent absolute ownership. 4 Indiana courts .have
also talked of qualified ownership, but this was said to consist in the ex-
clusive right to drill. 5 This theory was first enunciated in the 1890's in
conjunction with litigation attacking the constitutionality of Indiana's
gas conservation statutes as a taking of property without due process of
law." The Indiana Supreme Court had previously quoted from a Penn-
sylvania case which espoused the ownership in place theory, but did not
openly adopt that view. 7
The interest of the lessee in an oil and gas lease has been classified
71. See Knight, Oil Interests in Trusts and Estates, 32 TRUST BULL. 18 (1953);
Graham, Administration of Mineral Interests in Trust Accounts, 33 TRUST BULL. 26(1954).
72. For a sample provision, see Blake, Power of a Trustee to Lease for Oil and
Gas, 22 So. CALIF. L. Ray. 115, 128 (1949).
73. Indiana has had two distinct oil booms. The first was at the turn of the cen-
tury in east-central Indiana, and the second in the southwestern part of the state in the
last two decades. Oil is the state's second most valuable mineral with a total product
in 1953 of $37'/ million. Tests are being made to reach lower Ordovician and the en-
tire Cambrian strata, which underly the whole state and are the same age and of the
same characteristics as the productive limestones of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico.
IND. UNIv. BUR. OF Bus. RES., INDIANA'S ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND POTENTIAL, Sec.
IV., "Material Resource Base," 61-66 (1955).
74. See New Am. Oil and Mining Co. v. Troyer, 166 Ind. 402, 77 N.E. 719 (1906);
Halbert v. Hendrix, 121 Ind. App. 43, 95 N.E.2d 221 (1950) ; Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs,
115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944) ; Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E.
490 (1902).
75. Fairbanks v. Warrum, 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N.E. 983 (1913); Heller v.
Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490 (1902).
76. See State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N.E. 809 (1898), aff'd, 177 U.S.
190 (1900) ; Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N.E. 19 (1897).
77. See People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59 (1892). Cf. BRIGGS,
TITLE TO OIL AND GAS IN INDIANA, 19 (unpublished thesis in Indiana Law School Li-
brary 1921).
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as an incorporeal hereditament,"8 although other designations have been
made.79  It is definitely not a lease in the ordinary sense.8" Oil and gas
leases create an interest in land, thus placing them within the statute of
frauds.81 A 1951 Indiana statute lists rights transferred to the lessee of
an oil and gas lease in addition to other rights naturally flowing from
such an instrument at law.8 2
Indiana has no cases concerning the power of a trustee to execute an
oil and gas lease in the absence of express authority in the trust instru-
ment. In the life tenant-remainderman situation Indiana courts have
decreed that an oil and gas lease by the life tenant amounts to waste
against the remaindermen.83 The open mine doctrine has been applied
to a case where an oil well was drilled after the establishment of a life
tenancy, but under a lease previously executed by the testator. 4
The Indiana Supreme Court expressed an antagonistic attitude to-
ward oil production in 1898, which undoubtedly would not be repeated
today. 5 In 1905, the appellate court was not swayed by the argument
that gas was being drained by nearby wells and would be gone in a few
years, and refused to permit a life tenant to execute an oil and gas lease
on the property. 6 More recently, the appellate court has recognized that
oil and gas leases are in a class by themselves,87 and has held that oil and
gas are not conveyed by a deed of "all the coal and fireclay and minerals
78. Callihan v. Bander, 117 Ind. App. 467, 73 N.E.2d 360 (1947) ; Heeter v. Hardy,
118 Ind. App. 256, 76 N.E.2d 590 (1947); Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App.
236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944) ; Shark v. Stahl, 35 Ind. App. 493, 74 N.E. 538 (1905).
79. See New Am. Oil and Mining Co. v. Troyer, 162 Ind. 402, 77 N.E. 719 (1906)
(contract) ; Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 146, 70 N.E. 149 (1904)
(more than a license, but not a tenancy from year to year) ; Stahl v. Illinois Oil Co.,
45 Ind. App. 211, 90 N.E. 632 (1910) (covenant).
80. Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 146, 70 N.E. 149 (1904).
81. Callihan v. Bander, 117 Ind. App. 467, 73 N.E.2d 360 (1947).
82. These are the right to go upon the land to test for oil and gas, and the right
to drill a well whether or not the owner of the remaining rights consents. The lessee
is accountable to the owner of the surface for damage to crops, but he can construct
the necessary equipment for drilling. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 46-1801-1806 (Bums
1952). The original bill purported to repeal contrary statutes and the common law to
the extent that it was inconsistent with this bill. IND. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 1951, H. B. 283.
This section was deleted by amendment in the senate. See IND. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 1951
SENATE J., 779.
83. See Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4, 95 N.E. 225 (1911) ; Richmond Natural
Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N.E. 525 (1905).
84. See Andrews v. Andrews, 31 Ind. App. 189, 67 N.E. 461 (1903); Fairbanks
v. Warrum, 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N.E. 903 (1913) (dicta).
85. "We had petroleum oil for more than a third of a century before its discovery
in this state, imported from other states, and we could continue to do so if the produc-
tion of oil should cease in this state." State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 46, 49 N.E.
809, 817 (1898).
86. See Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N.E. 525
(1905).
87. See Heeter v. Hardy, 118 Ind. App. 256, 76 N.E.2d 590 (1947).
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underlying the surface.""8  The decision in the latter case was based on
the theory that since there could be no ownership of oil and gas in place,
there could be no conveyance of it in fee simple. This may have led to
the 1951 statute, which, declares that "interests in oil and gas may be
created . . .in fee." '89
In the field of trusts, the Indiana Appellate Court has said that the
power of sale "can only be exercised in conformity with the requirements
of the instrument by which the trust is created and in furtherance of the
ends to be attained by the creation of the trust."9 It held that the power
to sell did not authorize a trustee to barter or exchange the property for
other property. There have been other general statements to the effect
that the intention of the settlor is controlling, and that the trustee has only
those powers given him in the trust instrument."' It has been held that
the primary purpose and intention of the settlor may be to provide for
the life beneficiary.9 2 If the court is willing to act upon this statement, it
may find a power to execute an oil and gas lease more easily than if it
limits the settlors intention strictly to the powers given.
There has been no language in the Indiana cases equating an oil
and gas lease with a sale of the property. Thus, it might be difficult to
convince the court that the settlor intended to give the trustee authority
to execute an oil and gas lease by a grant of the power of sale. On the
other hand, the court may choose to follow the jurisdictions which have
held that a power of sale coupled with at least management responsibili-
ties includes a power to execute an oil and gas lease. Indiana has no
precedent which would conflict with the latter position.
In 1948, an Indiana court for the first time ordered the sale of trust
property despite the settlor's express prohibition.93 A general power of
equitable deviation to preserve the trust purpose was declared by the
court apart from the Indiana statute on this subject.9 -It seems that the
court should also use this power to order an oil and gas lease in the proper
circumstances. But the force of this decision as precedent is weakened
by the fact that the case concerned a charitable trust.
88. Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 117 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944).
89. Irn. ANN. STAT. § 46-1803 (Burns 1952).
90. Holsapple v. Shrontz, 65 Ind. App. 390, 399, 117 N.E. 547, 550 (1917).
91. Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 113 Ind. App. 633, 48 N.E.2d 181 (1943);
Koehler v. Koehler, 75 Ind. App. 510, 121 N.E. 450 (1919).
92. Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., supra note 91.
93. Foust, Att'y Gen. v. William E. English Foundation, 114 Ind. App. 484, 80
N.E.2d 303 (1948). See Recent Cases, 24 IND. L. J. 464 (1949).
94. The statute permits the court to order a sale of the trust property at the
complaint of the trustee or cestui que trust if it is shown that either (1) the real estate
is liable to waste or depreciation, (2) taxes exceed income, or (3) the sale would bene-
fit the trust and cestui que trust. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-621-626 (Burns 1951).
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Indiana has statutory provisions for the leasing of land for oil and
gas by executors, administrators, and guardians pursuant to a court
order."5 There is also a statutory method whereby state, 6 county, and
city and township lands" may be leased for oil and gas. But no statute
deals with the power of a trustee to execute an oil and gas lease. The
trust act says simply that a sale, conveyance, or other act by a trustee in
contravention of a trust shall be void.9
Legislation in this area would seem to be desirable because of the
uncertainty of the law and the widespread lack of provisions in trust
instruments expressly empowering trustees to grant oil and gas leases.' 0
A statute modelled after the Texas and Oklahoma provisions... would be
most propitious for express trusts. If properly drafted, the statute could
be a substitute for careful draftsmanship of the trust instrument. It
should include a presumption of an authority to execute an oil and gas
lease upon all or a part of the trust lands in the absence of a contrary pro-
vision in the trust instrument. A section providing for the division of
the royalty between income and principal would be essential. The lease
should bind contingent remaindermen and be valid even though it extends
beyond the termination of the trust. The trustee should also be per-
mitted to enter pooling and unitization contracts and to execute agree-
ments to amend, modify, or extend the oil and gas lease.
THE INDIANA UNIFORM GIFTS TO MINORS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
A simple and inexpensive statutory method of making gifts of se-
curities or money to minors was enacted by the Indiana General Assem-
bly during the 1957 legislative session.' The impetus for passage of this
statute, cited as the Indiana Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,2 originated
with a Model Bill drafted by the New York Stock Exchange in 1955 to
95. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-401-405 (Burns 1949).
96. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 46-1602-1624 (Burns 1952).
97. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 26-643-645 (Burns Supp. 1957).
98. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-515-516 (Burns Supp. 1957).
99. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-605 (Burns 1951).
100. See Blake, Power of a Trustee to Lease for Oil and Gas, 22 So. CALIF. L. av.
115 (1949).
101. See notes 52 and 53 supra.
1. Ind. Acts 1957, c. 247, §§ 1-11, at 564-72.
2. IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-810 (Burns Supp. 1957).
